The Untold Story: Was General Zia-ul-Haq Behind the Slaughter of 25,000 Palestinians?

Zia-ul-Haq — Hero or Butcher? The New Social Media War Over History and Narratives

Amid Social Media Debates and Private Discussions, Why is Zia-ul-Haq Suddenly Portrayed as the ‘Killer of Palestinians’? Is This the Start of a New Historical Narrative?

By: Ahmad Saghir 

Independent Journalist and Political Analyst 

In Pakistan’s popular discourse, a persistent narrative claims that General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, while serving as a brigadier, led a Pakistani military contingent in Jordan during the 1970 Black September conflict, resulting in the massacre of up to 25,000 Palestinians under orders from the Jordanian monarchy. This story, often amplified on social media and in political rhetoric, portrays Zia as a central figure in a large-scale atrocity. 

However, a closer examination of declassified documents, historical analyses, and contemporary accounts reveals a more nuanced reality: Zia did play a supportive military role, but the claims of a Pakistani-led slaughter of 25,000 lack substantiation from reliable sources. Instead, the conflict’s casualties align with lower estimates, and Zia’s involvement was limited to advising and commanding Jordanian forces, not directing an independent Pakistani operation.

The Black September conflict, also referred to as the Jordanian Civil War, unfolded primarily between September 16 and 27, 1970, though skirmishes continued until July 1971. It stemmed from escalating tensions between King Hussein’s government and Palestinian fedayeen groups, particularly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat. Following Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, which saw Jordan lose the West Bank and East Jerusalem, an influx of over 300,000 Palestinian refugees bolstered the PLO’s presence in Jordan. By 1970, the fedayeen—estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 armed fighters—had established semi-autonomous zones in refugee camps and urban areas, setting up checkpoints, collecting “taxes,” and launching attacks on Israel, which provoked Israeli retaliatory strikes. Extreme factions within the PLO, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), openly advocated overthrowing the Hashemite monarchy, viewing it as a Western proxy.

The crisis ignited on September 6, 1970, when the PFLP hijacked four international flights (TWA Flight 741, Swissair Flight 100, Pan Am Flight 93, and BOAC Flight 775), diverting three to Dawson’s Field in Jordan and holding 371 hostages to demand the release of Palestinian prisoners. This act humiliated the Jordanian government and prompted King Hussein to declare martial law on September 16. The Jordanian Armed Forces, comprising about 65,000 troops (many of Palestinian descent with questionable loyalty), launched an offensive against PLO positions in Amman, Irbid, and other cities using tanks, artillery, and air support. Syria intervened on September 18, sending approximately 10,000 troops and 300 tanks from its 5th Infantry Division to aid the PLO, but withdrew by September 22 after suffering heavy losses from Jordanian counterattacks and the threat of Israeli involvement. A ceasefire, brokered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser on September 27, temporarily halted major fighting, though Jordan expelled remaining PLO forces by July 1971, relocating them to Lebanon.

Casualty figures remain contested due to the chaos of urban warfare and political biases. According to a declassified CIA analysis by Bruce Riedel, between 3,000 and 4,000 Palestinian fedayeen were killed, 600 Syrian troops were killed or wounded, and the Jordanian army reported 537 soldiers killed in action.  Civilian deaths, including among Palestinian refugees, were described as “sizable” but unquantified in archival records. Jordanian official estimates peg total deaths (fighters, soldiers, and civilians) at around 3,000, while PLO leader Yasser Arafat claimed 10,000 to 25,000 Palestinians perished, a figure echoed in some Arab media but unsupported by military logs.  Other scholarly sources, such as historian Joseph Massad, suggest PLO losses of 2,000 to 3,400, highlighting the discrepancy between rhetorical inflation and evidence-based counts.  No credible source attributes 25,000 deaths directly to Pakistani actions.

Zia-ul-Haq’s involvement adds complexity but does not support the exaggerated narrative. From 1967 to 1970, Zia headed a Pakistani military training mission in Jordan, reorganizing the Jordanian army into four divisions post-1967 defeat.  During the conflict, King Hussein dispatched Zia to assess Syrian forces near Irbid. Zia reported that Syria’s invasion was limited and recommended deploying the Royal Jordanian Air Force for strikes, which proved effective.  Sources, including former CIA official Jack O’Connell and Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan, indicate Zia planned the counteroffensive and commanded a Jordanian armored division (variously reported as the 2nd or 3rd) in battles against PLO and Syrian forces.  However, there is no evidence of Pakistani troops engaging in combat; Zia’s role was advisory and operational within Jordanian units.  Pakistani accounts, like those from diplomat Tayyab Siddiqui, emphasize Zia’s supportive capacity without direct violence, while critics label him the “butcher of Palestinians” based on unverified claims.  Hussein’s gratitude later influenced Zia’s promotion to Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff in 1976.

The exaggeration of 25,000 deaths and a Pakistani-led massacre serves political purposes, particularly in Pakistan, where it demonizes Zia’s regime (1977–1988) and aligns with pro-Palestinian sentiment. This narrative gained traction in op-eds and blogs, often uncritically repeating Arafat’s figures without archival scrutiny.  In contrast, balanced analyses from the CIA and historians like Nigel Ashton attribute the outcome to Hussein’s intelligence successes, army loyalty, and Syrian internal divisions, not foreign mercenaries.  The higher casualty claims reflect “contested memory,” amplified for symbolic effect in Arab and Pakistani

In conclusion, Black September resulted in thousands of deaths—predominantly in the low thousands for combatants—with Zia-ul-Haq contributing as a key advisor and commander of Jordanian forces, not as leader of a Pakistani slaughter. Archival evidence supports viewing the 25,000 figure as a myth, underscoring the need to distinguish historical fact from political hype. This episode highlights the perils of unchecked narratives in shaping collective memory.

Bibliography

1.  Riedel, Bruce. “Fifty Years after ‘Black September’ in Jordan.” Central Intelligence Agency, June 2020. https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Black-September-Jordan.pdf

2.  “Black September.” Wikipedia. Accessed October 7, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_September

3.  “Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.” Wikipedia. Accessed October 7, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Zia-ul-Haq

4.  Jha, Shubham Sharma. “When Pakistan’s Zia-ul-Haq helped Jordan King kill thousands of Palestinians.” The Indian Express, November 10, 2023. https://indianexpress.com/article/research/when-pakistans-zia-ul-haq-helped-jordan-king-kill-thousands-of-palestinians-9021408/

5.  Nanda, Prakash. “How Pakistan’s Zia-ul-Haq helped Jordan king massacre thousands of Palestinians.” India Today, October 20, 2023. https://www.indiatoday.in/history-of-it/story/israel-hamas-gaza-war-how-pakistan-army-zia-ul-haq-jordan-helped-king-hussein-massacre-thousands-of-palestinians-2451241-2023-10-20

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